Gordon Tullock’s Legacy

September 2018 By in Economics, Law, Political Theory
PETER BOETTKE AND ROSOLINO CANDELA, RICHARD WAGNER, WILLIAM SHUGHART, AND RANDALL HOLCOMBE
Abstract: Trained as a lawyer and practiced in the arts of war and diplomacy, Gordon Tullock opened economists’ eyes to new ways of viewing constitutional construction, the challenges of bureaucracy, the nature of government regulations, the problem of rent seeking, and the limits of voting. The four papers in this symposium explore the legacy of Gordon Tullock. The paper by Peter Boettke and Rosolino Candela as well as the paper by Richard Wagner attempt to highlight the important features of Tullock’s approach. The papers by William Shughart and Randall Holcombe explore two of Tullock’s relatively understudied contributions to political economy: his critique of the common law and his work on the political economy of redistribution

The Hayek-Friedman hypothesis on the press: is there an association between economic freedom and press freedom?

September 2018 By in Economics, Politics

CHRISTIAN BJØRNSKOV

JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

Abstract: The Hayek–Friedman hypothesis states that economic freedom is causally associated with stable democracy. I test a particular element of the hypothesis focusing on press freedom, which is arguably a necessary component of any democratic polity. Combining the Freedom House index of press freedom and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom yields a large annual panel dataset between 1993 and 2011. Estimates show that improvements in economic freedom are associated with subsequent improvements of press freedom. The overall association is mainly driven by changes in market openness.

The Birth of Pork: Local Appropriations in America’s First Century

September 2018 By in History, Politics

SANFORD C. GORDON and HANNAH K. SIMPSON

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Volume 112, Issue 3

Abstract: After describing a newly assembled dataset consisting of almost 9,000 local appropriations made by the U.S. Congress between 1789 and 1882, we test competing accounts of the politics surrounding them before offering a more nuanced, historically contingent view of the emergence of the pork barrel. We demonstrate that for most of this historical period—despite contemporary accusations of crass electoral motives—the pattern of appropriations is largely inconsistent with accounts of distributive politics grounded in a logic of legislative credit-claiming. Instead, support for appropriations in the House mapped cleanly onto the partisan/ideological structure of Congress for most of this period, and only in the 1870s produced the universalistic coalitions commonly associated with pork-barrel spending. We trace this shift to two historical factors: the emergence of a solid Democratic South, and growth in the fraction of appropriations funding recurrent expenditures on extant projects rather than new starts.

Can Libertarians Get Away with Fraud?

August 2018 By in Economics, Philosophy

BENJAMIN FERGUSON

ECONOMICS & PHILOSOPHY, Volume 34, Issue 2

Abstract: In this paper I argue that libertarianism neither prohibits exchanges in which consent is gained through deceit, nor does it entail that such exchanges are morally invalid. However, contra James Child’s (1994) similar claim, that it is incapable of delivering these verdicts, I argue that libertarians can claim that exchanges involving deceitfully obtained consent are morally invalid by appealing to an external theory of moral permissibility.

Lincoln and the Politics of the “Towering Genius”

August 2018 By in Political Theory

STEVEN B. SMITH

AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, Volume 7, Number 3

Abstract: This article examines Lincoln’s “Lyceum Speech” with its concern for the “towering genius” in politics against the backdrop of the recent rise of populism and demagoguery. Lincoln’s concern was with a new kind of problem, namely, the appearance of the romantic hero in politics, a figure presaged in the writings of Emerson and Thoreau and that took the form of radical conscience politics. The model of the transcendental hero was John Brown, whose abolitionist impulse put individual conscience above the law. I contrast the transcendental hero to Lincoln’s conception of constitutional statecraft as based on an ethic of moderation and self-restraint. The article concludes with a contrast between Lincoln and Tocqueville’s worry that the American democratic republic would be characterized by the absence of individuals of grand ambition. Lincoln, I argue, is a better guide to the politics of the contemporary moment.

Economic Foundations of the Territorial State System

August 2018 By in Economics, Political Theory

AVIDIT ACHARYA, ALEXANDER LEE

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Abstract: The contemporary world is organized into a system of territorial states in which rulers exercise authority inside clearly defined boundaries and recognize the authority of other rulers outside those boundaries. We develop a model to explain how the major economic and military developments in Europe starting in the fifteenth century contributed to the development of this system. Our model rationalizes the system as an economic cartel in which self‐interested and forward‐looking rulers maintain high tax revenues by reducing competition in the “market for governance.”

Money as meta-rule: Buchanan’s constitutional economics as a foundation for monetary stability

July 2018 By in Economics, Politics

PETER J. BOETTKE, ALEXANDER W. SALTER, DANIEL J. SMITH

PUBLIC CHOICE

Abstract: This paper explores James Buchanan’s contributions to monetary economics and argues these contributions form the foundation of a robust monetary economics paradigm. While often not recognized for his contributions to monetary economics, Buchanan’s scholarship offers important insights for current debates, especially the renewed interest in narrow banking in the wake of the financial crisis. We argue that the post-2007 crisis milieu creates a unique opportunity to recognize, as Buchanan did, the vital role that money plays in the market as the ‘grammar of commerce.’ That recognition makes the need for more fundamental reform of our monetary regimes at the constitutional level more apparent, making Buchanan’s work on monetary constitutions more relevant than ever before. We then discuss how adopting Buchanan’s monetary framework can improve both monetary scholarship and institutions.