A Previously Unpublished Correspondence between Adam Smith and Joseph Nicolas de Windischgratz

MENUDO, J.M., RIEUCAU, N.

HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Abstract: This article transcripts and comments on two letters by Adam Smith, and two letters by his correspondent Joseph Nicolas de Windischgrätz. These letters belong to a rather rich and lengthy exchange—which would end at the beginning of 1788—composed of at least sixteen pieces. As with the rest of the correspondence between them, the letters published here refer to the prize proposed by Windischgrätz in 1784–85. The Programme of this prize was looking for general formulas that would normalize all types of property transfer. Adam Smith replied that the great diversity of human customs did not lend itself to such formulas. In spite of his reluctance Smith eventually agreed to help Windischgrätz, but the prize had no winner.

Conditional Privacy Rights

MUNGAN, MURAT C.

JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS JITE, Volume 173, Issue 1

Abstract: People have subjective valuations of privacy. Thus, absent further considerations, efficiency requires that a person be afforded privacy if, and only if, his subjective valuation of privacy exceeds the social value of the information that would be disclosed through a violation of that person’s privacy. Absolute regimes that either always allow privacy, or never allow privacy, cannot achieve this result. This article shows that a conditional privacy regime can lead to efficient separation among people based on their subjective valuations of privacy. Moreover, this regime need not inefficiently distort information collection incentives or incentives to refrain from various acts that may generate collectible information.

Suffrage, labour markets and coalitions in colonial Virginia

ELENA NIKOLOVA & MILENA NIKOLOVA

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Abstract: We study Virginia’s suffrage from the early-17th century until the American Revolution using an analytical narrative and econometric analysis of unique data on franchise restrictions. First, we hold that suffrage changes reflected labour market dynamics. Indeed, Virginia’s liberal institutions initially served to attract indentured servants from England who were needed in the labour-intensive tobacco farming but deteriorated once worker demand subsided and planters replaced white workers with slaves. Second, we argue that Virginia’s suffrage was also the result of political bargaining influenced by shifting societal coalitions. We show that new politically influential coalitions of freemen and then of small and large slave-holding farmers emerged in the second half of the 17th and early-18th centuries, respectively. These coalitions were instrumental in reversing the earlier democratic institution\s. Our main contribution stems from integrating the labour markets and bargaining/coalitions arguments, thus proving a novel theoretical and empirical explanation for institutional change.

Secular Stagnation? The Effect of Aging on Economic Growth in the Age of Automation

DARON ACEMOGLU & PASCUAL RESTREPO

THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Abstract: Several recent theories emphasize the negative effects of an aging population on economic growth, either because of the lower labor force participation and productivity of older workers or because aging will create an excess of savings over desired investment, leading to secular stagnation. We show that there is no such negative relationship in the data. If anything, countries experiencing more rapid aging have grown more in recent decades. We suggest that this counterintuitive finding might reflect the more rapid adoption of automation technologies in countries undergoing more pronounced demographic changes, and provide evidence and theoretical underpinnings for this argument.

Historical Prevalence of Infectious Diseases, Cultural Values, and the Origins of Economic Institutions

BORIS NIKOLAEV AND RAUFHON SALAHODJAEV

KYKLOS, Volume 70, Issue 1

Abstract: It is widely believed that economic institutions such as competitive markets, the banking system, and the structure of property rights are essential for economic development. But why economic institutions vary across countries and what are their deep origins is still a question that is widely debated in the developmental economics literature. In this study, we provide an empirical test for the provocative hypothesis that the prevalence of infectious diseases influenced the formation of personality traits, cultural values, and even morality at the regional level (the so called Parasite- Stress Theory of Values and Sociality), which then shaped economic institutions across countries. Using the prevalence of pathogens as an instrument for cultural traits such as individualism, we show in a two-stage least squares analysis that various economic institutions, measured by different areas of the index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation, have their deep origins in the historical prevalence of infectious diseases across countries. Our causal identification strategy suggests that cultural values affect economic institutions even after controlling for a number of confounding variables, geographic controls, and for different sub-samples of countries. We further show that the results are robust to four alternative measures of economic and political institutions.

Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally

DAVID SKARBEK

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Volume 110, Issue 4

Abstract: Why does prison social order vary around the world? While many of the basic characteristics of prisons are similar globally, the extent and form of informal inmate organization varies substantially. This article develops a governance theory of prison social order. Inmates create extralegal governance institutions when official governance is insufficient. The size and demographics of the prison population explain why inmates produce extralegal governance institutions in either decentralized ways, such as ostracism, or through more centralized forms, such as gangs. Comparative analysis of Brazil, Bolivia, England, Scandinavia, and men’s and women’s prisons in California provide empirical support.

American Individualism Rises and Falls with the Economy: Cross-temporal Evidence that Individualism Declines When the Economy Falters

EMILY BIANCHI

JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Volume 111, Issue 3

Abstract: Past work has shown that economic growth often engenders greater individualism. Yet much of this work charts changes in wealth and individualism over long periods of time, making it unclear whether rising individualism is primarily driven by wealth or by the social and generational changes that often accompany large-scale economic transformations. This article explores whether individualism is sensitive to more transient macroeconomic fluctuations, even in the absence of transformative social changes or generational turnover. Six studies found that individualism swelled during prosperous times and fell during recessionary times. In good economic times, Americans were more likely to give newborns uncommon names (Study 1), champion autonomy in children (Study 2), aspire to look different from others (Study 3), and favor music with self-focused language (Study 4). Conversely, when the economy was floundering, Americans were more likely to socialize children to attend to the needs of others (Study 2) and favor music with other-oriented language (Study 4). Subsequent studies found that recessions engendered uncertainty (Study 5) which in turn tempered individualism and fostered interdependence (Study 6).